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All usWe study how intelligence and personality affect the outcomes of
groups, focusing on repeated interactions that provide the opportu-
nity for profitable cooperation. Our experimental method creates
two groups of subjects who have different levels of certain traits, such
as higher or lower levels of Intelligence, Conscientiousness, andAgree-
ableness, but who are very similar otherwise. Intelligence has a large
andpositive long-runeffectoncooperativebehavior.Theeffect is strong
when at the equilibrium of the repeated game there is a trade-off be-
tweenshort-rungainsandlong-runlosses.ConscientiousnessandAgree-
ableness have a natural, significant but transitory effect on coopera-
tion rates.I. IntroductionThe effect of intelligence and personality and outcomes in single-agent
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Alltween intelligence and outcomes for a single individual is natural and
clear. Higher intelligence functions as a technological factor; it allows
larger, faster, and better levels of production. This prediction is natural
and is also supported by extensive research in psychology and economics
(Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua 2006; Jones and Schneider 2010). Simi-
larly, when the task requires consistent application of effort, we can ex-
pect higher consistency in subjects with a higher Conscientiousness score.
When the interaction is strategic instead, the link may be complex. This is
what we study here.
A possible conceptual link between intelligence and behavior in social
situations follows if we view choice in economic and social interactions
as a cognitive task; the link follows as a corollary. This view produces the
general idea that intelligence reduces behavioral biases (e.g., Frederick
2005; Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro 2013). For exam-
ple, higher intelligence may reduce violations of transitivity; or, in choice
under uncertainty, the behavior of subjects with higher intelligence is bet-
ter described by expected subjective utility. When we apply this intuition
to behavior in strategic environments, we are led to the conjecture that
more intelligent individuals in real life—and in an experiment—will ex-
hibit a behavior closer to the game theoretic predictions. When refine-
ments of theNash concept, such as subgameperfection, are relevant, then
one should expect behaviormore in line with the prediction of the refine-
ment for individuals of higher intelligence. This prediction finds some
support when games are strictly competitive (such as the Hit 15 game
in Burks et al. [2009]). Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009) show that individ-
uals who are better trained (or better able) to solve complex problems by
backward induction make choices that are closer to game theoretic pre-
dictions in the centipede game. In a repeated beauty contest experiment,
Gill and Prowse (2016) show that more intelligent individuals demonstrate
better analytic reasoning and thus converge faster to the uniqueNash equi-
librium.
While these contributions provide important insights into the way cog-
nition affects reasoning on strategic interactions, fundamental questions
remain. First, in games that are not strictly competitive, which are per-for discussions on this and related research, especially Gary Charness, Pedro Dal Bó, Drew
Fudenberg, Guillaume Fréchette, Gianluca Grimalda, John Kagel, David Levine, Marco
Lambrecht, Josh Miller, Charles A. Murray, Mahnaz Nazneen, Andrew Oswald, Antonio
Penta, Doris Pischedda, Louis Putterman, Carlo Reverberi, Angelo Rustichini, Andrew
Shotter, Juuso Välimäki, and the participants of the National Bureau of Economic Re-
search Economics of Culture and Institutions 2015 meeting in Boston. We thank the Cen-
ter for Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy and the Behavioural Science Global
Research Priority for generous funding. Rustichini thanks the National Science Founda-
tion, grant 1728056. Sofianos thanks the support of the Economic and Social Research
Council (grant ES/J500203/1). We adopt the capital letter for Intelligence, Agreeableness,
and so on for the technical rather than colloquial use. Data are provided as supplementary
material online.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000haps more relevant for social behavior, the prediction fails. This occurs
already in the case of one-shot games. In Burks et al. (2009), the authors
study the behavior of subjects in a sequential trust game. Using a strategy
method to identify choices of subjects as first and second mover, and re-
lating this behavior to the intelligence of the subjects, the authors find
that initial transfers are increasing with the IQ score, a behavior that is fur-
ther from the prediction of the subgame perfect equilibrium, and so the
opposite of what we should expect according to the general hypothesis.
Similarly, transfers as secondmovers among the more intelligent subjects
are higher when the first mover transfers more and smaller in the oppo-
site case. A second and more important consideration is that the predic-
tion of a unique strategic behavior is rare: for example, repeated games
generally present a multiplicity of equilibria. Thus, games with a unique
Nash equilibrium cannot address the crucial issue for the social sciences
of how individuals coordinate to reach one amongmany possible equilib-
ria. Game theory and the initial intuition of modeling strategic behavior
as a cognitive task leave us with few useful predictions.A. Strategies and RulesTo progress, we think of strategies as composed of rules. A rule is a con-
ditional statement prescribing an action given a relevant condition. In
our experimental setup, relevant conditions are the histories available to
players. These histories include the partial histories of play in all the
matchings that have occurred until the current round. An example of a
rule is “If the other player defects, defect for one period.” A strategy is a
complete set of rules—complete because an action is prescribed by the
set of all rules in all possible contingencies.
When we consider performance of players in isolation, evidence sug-
gests that intelligence may affect implementation of rules even in simple
tasks. For example, Duncan et al. (2008) study a specific form of failure
called goal neglect; this occurs when an individual knows he should apply
a rule and, if asked, is even able to state it but nevertheless fails to apply
it. Such failures occur more frequently in individuals with lower intelli-
gence. Goal neglect is identified in a task in which subjects have to con-
siderpairsofnumbersandletterspresentedsequentially (e.g.,(A, 7), (S,M),
(2, 6)). They initially have to follow this rule: “Read the item on the right, if
it is a letter, and ignore it, if a number.” So, in our example they should read
the letter M in the second pair and nothing from the other two pairs. At
some random interval, a plus or a minus sign appears that may modify
the rule. The plusmeans “Continue as before” and theminusmeans “Read
the item on the left,” again, only if it is a letter. With subjects of lower in-
telligence, the modifier of the rule (the plus or the minus) tends to be ig-
nored. The result indicates a high correlation between IQ score and theThis content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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Allability to adjust to the switch required by the appearance of the minus
sign. We model this error in decision making by relying on a new axiom-
atic theory of stochastic choice (Cerreia-Vioglio et al. 2017); the model
allows for precise estimation of the way in which intelligence and person-
ality traits affect the frequency of errors.B. Experimental DesignThe main hypothesis we test is the potential association between intelli-
gence, personality, and strategic behavior in groups. The strategic interac-
tion takes place between two players, but within a pool of subjects who are
similar in intelligence or personality. We rely on a well-established meth-
odology in the experimental analysis of repeated games and use the same
setting as in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), where the authors show how,
with appropriate probability of continuation and payoffs, subjects in a re-
peated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a random probability of termina-
tion may collectively converge to cooperation equilibria. We test whether
higher intelligence in such an environment favors a more flexible and pre-
cise behavior that allows processing of richer information, that is, whether
higher intelligence allows for more efficient equilibria to be reached. We
use the samemethodology to test whether other personality traits (Consci-
entiousness and Agreeableness) have similar effects.C. Paper LayoutThe paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we formulate our hypoth-
eses on the role of intelligence and personality on the strategic behavior.
In Section III, we present the experimental design and ourmodel of error
in decisionmaking. Thenext two sections analyze the role of intelligence: in
Section IV, we discuss how intelligence affects errors in implementation
and thus cooperation, while in Section V, we show how differences in in-
telligence affect strategic reasoning. The role of Conscientiousness and
Agreeableness is discussed in Section VI. The effect of intelligence on re-
sponse time is discussed in Section VII. Section VIII presents our conclu-
sions. Additional technical analysis, robustness checks, details of the ex-
perimental design, and descriptive statistics are in the online appendix.II. Intelligence, Personality, and Strategic Behavior:
HypothesesIn a repeated game with a high discount factor the set of subgame per-
fect equilibrium outcomes may be large, so the analysis of the effect of
personality on choice may seem hard at first sight. However, experimen-
tal evidence on subjects’ behavior indicates that the set of observed out-This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000comes is considerably smaller than the entire one predicted by subgame
perfect equilibria. Typically subjects reach a tacit (the only communica-
tion occurs through history of actions) agreement on outcomes that are
efficient within the equilibrium set (constrained efficient). The outcomes
are also simple to implement; for example, a formulation of the strategy
profile with a finite state automaton is natural, and the number of the
states of the automaton is small. Finally, the agreement is usually reached
on outcomes that give at least approximately equal payoffs, within the lim-
its imposed by the payoff of the game. We summarize these criteria into
an assumption to organize our analysis:
Assumption 2.1. Subjects try to achieve a constrained efficient, sim-
ple outcome withminimumdifference among final payoffs of the players.
Our data in this paper offer additional support for assumption 2.1.
Under this simplifying assumption, we proceed to formulate more sub-
stantial predictions.A. Intelligence and Strategic BehaviorWe investigate how intelligence affects strategic behavior in repeated in-
teractions and hypothesize that intelligence may affect behavior in two
different ways:
i. Intelligence may affect the choice of strategies by affecting the set
of strategies that are conceived by the individual. For example, a
strategy like Always Defect (AD) in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) is very simple to conceive. By contrast, a strategy prescribing
cooperating in the first round, defecting against a defection of the
partner for three periods, and then returning to cooperation only
after the partner has cooperated for the past three periods is more
complex to ideate. Thus, more intelligent individuals may choose
more profitable strategies in a larger set.
ii. Intelligence may affect the implementation of the strategies. More
complex strategies are more difficult to implement; for example,
the AD strategy does not require a record of actions of the two players
and does not require a check of a sequence of conditional state-
ments, whereas Tit-for-Tat (TfT) does. We hypothesize that the per-
formance failure of lower-Intelligence players is related to that ob-
served in goal neglect.
We formulate the general hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.1. Higher-Intelligence subjects (i) find a better strat-
egy—that is, with higher payoff—and conceive a larger set of strategies
in a given environment and (ii) are more consistent in their implementa-
tion. Given the aim stated in assumption 2.1 (which holds independentlyThis content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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Allof the intelligence level), higher-Intelligence subjects will achieve, in gen-
eral, higher rates of cooperation.
Wewill test part ii of the hypothesis in Section IV and part i in Section V;
in the rest of this section we will derive more specific predictions from
these hypotheses.B. Intelligence and Rule ImplementationThe next hypotheses are easier to present if we describe the games we
use in our experiments. We consider repeated games with a symmetric
two-player, two-action stage game. These are now well understood exper-
imentally. After relabeling of the action choices of one or both players,
this game can be written in the standard form:
L R
T a, a c, b
B b, c d, d
, (1)
where a, b, c, and d are four possibly different numbers. Again relabeling,
if necessary, we can assume a ≥ d and b ≥ c. In appendix A we present a
detailed and simple analysis of the equilibria of repeated games with dis-
count d ∈ ð0, 1Þ with such stage games. We will formulate our specific hy-
potheses on the basis of this analysis. Here are our main conclusions.
The four different repeated games we use in the paper are represen-
tative of different and very specific strategic situations. They are Prisoner’s
Dilemma, PD (where ða, b, c, dÞ 5 ð48, 50, 12, 25Þ), Battle of Sexes, BoS
((0, 48, 25, 0)), StagHunt, SH((48, 25, 0, 25)), andanewgame thatwe call
the Battle of the Sexes with Compromise, BoSC ((48, 52, 12, 10)) (see
app. tables A.1–A.4). The BoSC game may be considered as a modifica-
tion of the Hawk-Dove game, requiring the payoff from (Dove, Dove) to
bestrictly largerthanthemeanof(Hawk,Dove)and(Dove,Hawk).Actions
are labeled in the paper with mnemonic letters: C and D for the PD, B
(allowing the players’ best payoff) and W (worst nonzero payoff) for BoS
and BoSC, and finally S (stag) and H (hare) for SH.
In the analysis (app. A) we show that the stage games we consider in
this paper cover the interesting cases of repeated games with stage games
of the form (1) above. The few (two) cases we do not address have no sub-
stantial independent interest. The first is a stage game with a single equal
outcome Nash equilibrium that is efficient (this is case 3 in app. A); we
consider this game too trivial to be worth analyzing experimentally, since
the efficient equilibrium is obvious. The other is mentioned in case 4b,
namely, the PD with an efficient alternating equilibrium: but the essential
point of this game is covered by the BoSC.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000The games we consider have natural and simple equilibria: the corre-
sponding action profile outcomes are (S, S) in every round giving the SH
efficient outcome and an alternation between the action profiles giving
the best outcome for one player and the worst (among the positive ones)
outcome for the second, that is, (B,W ) and (W, B) for BoS and joint co-
operation (C, C) in every round for PD, when the parameters make co-
operation sustainable. In these equilibria the outcome in every round is
either a repetition of the same action profile or an alternation between
two action profiles (in BoS). The new game, the BoSC, has a simple out-
comemirroring that of the BoS of alternating between (B,W ) and (W, B);
but the compromise action profile (W,W ) in every round gives a payoff (48,
48)that ishigherthantheaverageof thetwooutcomes(52,12)and(12,52)
given by alternating. The positive and symmetric payoff outcome (10, 10)
for the (B, B) profile (rather than (0, 0), as in BoS) was chosen to make
the coordination on the constant outcome (W, W ) more difficult. In all
cases, an equilibrium that satisfies assumption 2.1 is easy to discover after
simple inspection of the stage game; that is, within the class of symmetric
two-player, two-action stagegames, a typical college student caneasily iden-
tify the equilibrium and safely assume that the partner does too. The ex-
isting literature on experimental repeated games confirms for PD, BoS,
and SH that the equilibria we describe as natural are indeed typically
the outcome. In light of these considerations, it is possible that, when sub-
jects are college students, there is no substantial difference in the ideation
of the possible strategies in the class of repeated games with a symmetric
two-player, two-action stage game. To see these differences, research will
have to adopt different groups of subjects or a different class of games.
There is a specific difficulty in the case of the BoS that is clearer when
we compare the gamewith the SH, a game in which (as we see later) there
should be no difference in implementation. The efficient equilibrium
outcome in SH is particularly simple to see, and achieving coordination
on it is easy: the only tempting feature of the choice of actionH is the lack
of risk associated with it. By comparison, the alternating equilibrium in
BoS is more complex. First, subjects have to understand that alternation
is a way to avoid the zero payoff outcomes, and they have to communicate
this idea to their partner. Second, they have to agree on the order of the
alternation, and the only symmetric way to do this is to play randomly ei-
ther action in the early rounds, starting the alternation at the first instance
of coordination on a positive payoff outcome. Although these consider-
ations are within the intellectual reach of a college student, the details of
the coordinationprocess aremore complex in theBoS; hence theremight
be a difference in the speed at which subjects of different intelligence reach
coordination, and there is the possibility that players of lower intelligence
never reach that point. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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AllHypothesis 2.2. Subjects of higher intelligence are faster in achiev-
ing coordination in the efficient alternating equilibrium in BoS, whereas
there is no substantial difference in SH.
From the point of view of strategy implementation, instead, there are
two classes of games with a substantial difference concerning the trade-
off between gain from deviation in the current round and loss from de-
viation in the continuation game. In the first group (which includes BoS,
SH, and in general the classes 1, 2a, and 3 in app. A) there is no trade-off
between gain from deviation in the current round and change in the con-
tinuationvalue: adeviation inducesa loss inboth. In theothergroup(which
includes PD and BoSC and in general classes 2b and 4 in app. A) there is a
trade-off: deviating from the equilibrium action profile induces a gain in
the current payoff and a loss in the continuation value.
This opens the possibility of errors depending on the intelligence level
of the subjects, similar to the “goalneglect” conceptdescribed inSection I.
When there is a trade-off between short-termgain and long-term loss, sub-
jects of lower intelligence may neglect to follow the rule dictated by the
chosen strategy andmay play tomaximize their earnings in the short term.
Accordingly, a fundamental difference between SH and BoS on one hand
and PD and BoSC on the other is that at the equilibrium action profile
there is a trade-off present in every round between short-run gain fromde-
viation and long-run loss. Instead, there is no such trade-off in SH and
BoS. This justifies a specific hypothesis in our environment:1
Hypothesis 2.3. The trade-off between current gain and continua-
tion value loss from deviation in PD and BoSC produces a difference in
cooperation rates across IQ groups in these games. In SH and BoS, there
is no trade-off, and, thus, no difference in the implementation between
the IQ groups, once coordination is reached.C. Strategic Behavior and PersonalityTwo of the Big Five factors are more likely to be relevant for strategic be-
havior: Agreeableness and Conscientiousness. Agreeableness directly af-
fects the social behavior of individuals; Conscientiousness influences the
effectiveness and orderliness of execution of tasks, in particular of cogni-
tive tasks like strategy implementation.
In the IPIP-NEO-120 inventory ( Johnson 2014) that we use for concep-
tualization andmeasurement of personality, Conscientiousness has six fac-
ets. Four are potentially relevant in fostering equilibrium cooperation in
our context, because they ensure an effective andmindful implementation
of thestrategy, consideredhereasa ruleof individualbehavior; theyare self-
efficacy, orderliness, achievement-striving, and self-discipline. Two other facets
are more specific to the strategic side of our experiment: a higher score1 In app. C, we offer the historical evolution of hypothesis formulation and design.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000in dutifulness might prevent a subject from defecting, whereas a higher
score in cautiousness might induce the individual to refrain from coopera-
tion in PD, because it exposes her to a risk of defection of the other. Part
of this effect may be captured by risk aversion, but cautiousness might
have a distinct effect and be particularly relevant when the individual
has experienced past defection. In summary, the first five facets might in-
duce amore cooperative behavior, while cautiousness might have an oppo-
site effect on the willingness of the individual to cooperate.2
Hypothesis 2.4. The facet cautiousness of Conscientiousness may
decrease unconditional cooperative behavior in repeated PD; the other
facets may increase it. Thus the overall effect of Conscientiousness is am-
biguous and may require analysis of the facets.
Agreeableness has six facets; three of them are particularly relevant for
behavior in repeated games. One, altruism, may indicate how much the
payoff to the other player matters to the subject. The other two, trust and
cooperation, should affect how likely they expect cooperative behavior from
others (e.g., when choosing C in PD) and how inclined they are to coop-
erate with others. All these facets should clearly provide a motivation to
cooperate. Our natural hypothesis is then as follows:
Hypothesis 2.5. Agreeableness increases unconditional cooperative
behavior in repeated PD through the facets of altruism, trust, and coop-
eration.III. Experimental Design and EstimationOur design involves a two-part experiment administered over two differ-
ent days separated by 1 day in between. Participants are allocated into
two groups according to some individual characteristic that is measured
during the first part, and they are asked to return to a specific session to
play several repetitions of a repeated game. Each repeated game is played
with a new partner. The individual characteristics that we consider are In-
telligence, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, across different treat-
ments that we will define as IQ-split, A-split, and C-split, respectively. In
one treatment, participants are not separated according to any character-
istic, but rather allocated to ensure similar groups across characteristics;
we define this as the combined treatment.
The matching of partners is done within each session under an anon-
ymous and random rematching protocol. The group size of different ses-
sions varies depending on the numbers recruited in each week.3 Unless2 All the questions we used to assess the personality traits and their facets can be found
in the Experimental Documents available online.
3 The bottom panels of tables A.5–A.11 list the sample size of each session across all
treatments. Participants were not directly informed of the number of subjects in their ses-
sion, but they could see how many people would take part prior to their entry to the lab.
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Allspecified otherwise, the length of play of the repeated game during the
second day was 45 minutes. As usual, we define as a supergame each re-
peated game played; period refers to the round within a specific super-
game; and, finally, round refers to an overall count of the number of times
the stage game has been played across supergames during the session.
Subjects in the two different groups based on the specific characteristic
of thedifferent treatmentsareotherwisereasonablysimilar(see tablesA.61–
A.67). We observe systematic differences only in one treatment, the C-split;
this is unlikely to generate confounding as will be clear from the economet-
ric analysis below.
Across all treatments, the subjects are not informed about the basis on
which the split wasmade.4 In a subset of our sessions (IQ-split sessions only)
we ask the participants during the debriefing stage (i.e., after all the tasks
were completed during the second day) whether they understood the basis
on which the allocation to sessions was made. Only one or two participants
out of the approximately 100 asked mentioned Intelligence as the possible
determining characteristic; the rest appeared to be unaware of the alloca-
tion procedure. (Many participants believed that the allocations were done
randomly.)5 A complete list of the treatments is reported in appendix D.2.
Unless stated otherwise, all participants were noneconomists who had
not taken any game theory modules or classes.6 A total of 792 subjects
participated in the final experimental sessions. They earned on average
around £20 each; the participation payment was £4. The ethical approval
for the design was granted by the Humanities and Social Sciences Re-
search Ethics Committee at the University of Warwick under the Decision
ResearchatWarwickUmbrellaApproval (Ref: 81/12–13).Alldetails about
the design are in appendix D, and descriptive statistics of the different ses-
sions and treatments are in appendix H.
Strategy of analysis.—In the experiment we generally collect multiple
data for each subject i ∈ f1, ::: ,N gmaking choices or achieving a payoff
in different periods t ∈ f1, ::: , Tig that we aim to explain. Hence our raw
data have a panel structure. In appendix E.1.1 we present three types of4 We initially ran two sessions in which we informed participants about their Raven
scores as well as the average in the session. The cooperation rates of these sessions are pre-
sented in app. K and do not seem to be different from the other sessions in which partic-
ipants did not have this information.
5 How intelligent players adjust their strategy if they know that they interact only with
high-IQ types or with heterogeneous types in our experimental setting would be an inter-
esting subject for further research. Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2009), analyzing this issue in
an experimental analysis based on the centipede game, show that there is an effect.
6 The recruitment was conducted with the Decision Research at Warwick system, based
on the SONA recruitment software. The recruitment ensured that the participants were
selected from across the university student population and represented a wide variety of
degree courses, which were evenly divided across sessions. Some examples of the partici-
pants’ degree courses are accounting and finance, business, film studies, physics, and psy-
chology (see tables A.12–A.18 in app. D for the full list of degree courses across the differ-
ent treatments).
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000models we estimate in the analysis of the effect of intelligence and per-
sonality traits on the cooperative choices.
Inwhat follows, we give a precise and testable formulation of the second
part of hypothesis 2.1 relying on the axiomatic characterization (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. 2017) of choice probabilities of the softmax form, which de-
pend on a parameter t describing a characteristic or type of the subject:
pt x, Xð Þ 5 e
l tð Þu xð Þ
oz∈X el tð Þu zð Þ
, (2)
where pt(x,X ) is the probability that alternative x is selected from the setX
of feasible alternatives. The function l takes nonnegative values; the utility
function u in equation (2) is cardinally unique, and if u is nonconstant,
the function l is unique given u. In the original interpretation (Cerreia-
Vioglio et al. 2017) the parameter t is time, which can be interpreted as ex-
perience or reflection time. In the interpretation proposed here, t is the
type of the decision maker. At the lowest value of l(t) all alternatives have
the same chanceof being selected. At its highest value,1∞,u ismaximized
over A. At intermediate values, u is soft-maximized with intermediate ac-
curacy. As l(t) increases (e.g., if t 5 IQ score increases), the probability
that the true optimal alternative according to the utility u is chosen in-
creases monotonically. We adapt the formulation to our current environ-
ment of choice in repeated games, restricting the attention to the two-
actions case, labeled x and y. The value of each action in a round is defined
given (i) a history preceding the trial and (ii) the strategy of the players.
So uG(x) is the value for a player of choosing the action x in the game G
in the set {PD, BoS, SH, BoSC} (representing Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle
of Sexes, Stag-Hunt, and Battle of Sexes with Compromise, respectively).
It includes the expected current payoff, given the belief on the action of
the other, and the continuation value after that action given history and
strategy. We assume uGðxÞ < uGðyÞ (so x is the error); the probability of er-
ror is defined as the probability of choosing x given the characteristics t
and the values of each action and given by
PrðCh 5 xjG , tÞ 5 1
1 1 e2l tð Þ½uG xð Þ2uG yð Þ
(3)
so that the probability of error is higher with lower values of l(t) and with
lower difference uGðxÞ 2 uGðyÞ.IV. Path of Cooperation and Errors in Implementation
In our general hypothesis 2.1 we identified two possible main directions
of the effect of intelligence. As we are going to see, consistency in strategy
implementation (point ii) has the strongest effect, andwe begin from that
point. We provide two main tests of this hypothesis.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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AllThe first test we present in the section below relies on an experimental
manipulation: our main substantive hypothesis 2.3 predicts a difference
in behavior between the two groups of subjects with different intelligence
in games (such as, in our design, PD and BoSC), where the natural equi-
libria (those satisfying assumption 2.1 and described in Sec. II.B and
app. A) exhibit a trade-off between short-term gain from deviation and
long-term loss. We then compare these results with games in which this
trade-off does not exist (such as, in our design, SH and BoS), which we
analyze in Section IV.B.
The second test is an analysis of the probability of error in choice (in the
precise sense of eq. [3]), testing the prediction that error is more likely in
subjects with a lower IQ score; this test is provided in the descriptive anal-
ysis of Section IV.C and in the model-based analysis of Section IV.D.A. Games with Trade-offsWe present here the evidence supporting hypothesis 2.3, focusing first
on the repeated PD, where cooperation is likely in general groups of sub-
jects (as shown in Dal Bó and Fréchette [2011]), and on the BoSC, both
with high continuation probability, d 5 :75. The natural equilibria we
consider are those giving (C, C) outcome in all periods in PD (e.g., a pair
of Grim Trigger strategies for each player; the analysis of the empirical
frequency of the strategies is developed later) and those giving (W, W )
outcome for the BoSC (e.g., a pair of strategies in which both players play
W until either defects and thenplay themixed-strategy equilibrium). The
feature common to the two games is the short-run gain (of 2 points in
PD and 4 points in BoSC) at the equilibrium choice and the continuation
value loss fromdeviating.Thedifferencebetween the twogames is that for
PD a continuation strategy is easy to identify (e.g., play (D, D) in all peri-
ods), whereas what to do after the agreement to play (W,W ) fails is harder
to identify. Some natural possibilities are switching to the mixed strategy
or alternatingbetween (B,W ) and (W,B), but coordinating ononeof these
is harder.1. Differences in Cooperation and CompromiseIn the top-left panel of figure 1, we present the evolution of cooperation
in the low- and high-IQ sessions of the PD.7 The initial cooperation rates
(first five supergames) are similar in the two groups, but they progres-
sively diverge until the rate reaches between 80 and 90 percent for the
high-IQ group while remaining at about 40 percent for the low-IQ group.
The average individual payoff per round follows that of the cooperation7 Similar patterns replicate when we consider each individual IQ session; see fig. A.7 in
app. K.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000rates (right panel of fig. 1). In figure 2 we report the cooperation rates
for PD sessions in which individuals are not separated according to IQ
(i.e., the combined treatment); in the analysis of these sessions, we group
players into statistical partitions of high (Raven score larger than the spe-
cific session median) and low IQ. Here the cooperation rate increases
over time in both partitions, but it is consistently higher among the high-
IQ partition’s subjects, who also earn higher payoffs per supergame.8 This
pattern lends support to the hypothesis that individuals with higher intel-
ligence may try to teach individuals with lower intelligence, as in Hynd-
man et al. (2012).We will see belowmore evidence consistent with this hy-
pothesis. The payoffs of both partitions tend to grow and converge in the
end, which seems to rule out the possibility that more intelligent individ-
uals might extract surplus from those less intelligent.
The top-left panel of figure 3 reports the percentage of subjects reach-
ing the compromise outcome in the BoSC;9 the data are aggregated as inFIG. 1.—PD with high continuation probability: cooperation and payoffs per period in
the low- and high-IQ sessions. Panels A and B report the averages computed over observa-
tions in successive blocks of five supergames of all high- and all low-IQ sessions, aggregated
separately. The black and gray lines report the average cooperation for high- and low-IQ
subjects in each block. Panels C and D report the average of cooperation and payoffs in
the first round (of a repeated game) that occurs in the two IQ sessions separately. Bands
represent 95 percent confidence intervals.8 Similar patterns replicate when we consider each individual session; see fig. A.9 app. K.
9 In the BoSC and later in the BoS we consider outcome rather than choice as the de-
pendent variable. In both games there are different natural equilibria, e.g., in BoSC alter-
nating between (W, B) and (B, W ) or compromising on (W, W ). So it is easier to identify
whether they have coordinated on the first or on the second by considering outcomes.
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Allfigure 1.10 The figure clearly illustrates a difference in long-run behavior
in compromise rates of the two IQ groups. In the high-IQ group the frac-
tion of subjects playing the compromise outcome (W,W ) is higher than
in the low-IQ group, with an overall positive trend in the high-IQ group
and a negative trend for those in the low-IQ group. The bottom panels of
figure 3 show that the behavior in the first period is similar in the two
groups. The top-middle panel of figure 3 shows that the low-IQ group
more frequently plays the coordinationoutcomes (W,B) or (B,W ), which
constitute a lower average payoff. The difference in this frequency is ap-
proximately of the same size as the difference in the two groups’ compro-
mise rates.
Therefore, in summary, we have the following result:
Result 4.1. In PD and in BoSC the high-IQ group has larger rates of
cooperation and (respectively) compromise than the low-IQ group, as hy-
pothesis 2.3 predicts.FIG. 2.—PD with high continuation probability and combined sessions: cooperation
and payoffs per period in the low- and high-IQ partitions. Panels A and B report the aver-
ages computed over observations in successive blocks of five supergames of all high- and all
low-IQ partitions, aggregated separately. The dashed lines represent the average coopera-
tion in each block; the black and gray lines report the average cooperation for high- and
low-IQ partitions in each block. Panels C and D report the average of cooperation and pay-
offs in the first round (of a repeated game) among the two partitions. Bands represent 95 per-
cent confidence intervals.10 Similar patterns replicate when we consider each individual session; see app. L.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 0002. Effect of Individual Intelligence on Cooperation
and CompromiseIn appendix E.2.1, we estimate the effect of individual IQ and show that
the effect of intelligence is not due to observable confounding factors at
the individual levels and/or environmental factors at the session levels
(observable or not).
To disentangle the effect of individual intelligence from that of group
intelligence, we compare in table 1 the effect of the treatment of separat-
ing individuals according to their IQ group with the combined sessions.
The cooperation rate in the low-IQ sessions is about 14 percent lower
than in the combined sessions, costing about 3.5 units per round. There
is no significant difference between high-IQ sessions and combined ses-
sions. From column 3 we derive an estimate of the loss, in terms of pay-
offs, for any individual with a given level of IQ, in participating in a low-IQ
session. This is about three experimental units per round, not consider-
ing the experience effect of being able to play more rounds (col. 3). ThisFIG. 3.—BoSC: compromise, coordination, and payoffs per period in the low- and high-
IQ sessions. The top panels report averages computed over observations in blocks of five
supergames of all high- and all low-IQ sessions, aggregated separately; the black and gray
lines report the percentage of subjects achieving a compromise output, coordination out-
put, and average payoffs for high- and low-IQ sessions. The bottom panels report the aver-
ages in the first period among the two groups of sessions. Bands represent 95 percent con-
fidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000becomes about 3.9 units if we consider also the effect of the experience
(col. 6).3. Evolution of Behavior over the SessionWe cannotmake specific predictions for initial rates of cooperation in the
two groups: subjects in the early stages of the session know only that they
are facing repeated interactions within a match, and with repeated part-
ners within the session, so it is difficult to predict what they are thinking
about the behavior of others before they see how the others are playing.
For example, if the natural strategies in a game were complex, some ini-
tial difference in behavior according to intelligence might be possible. It
is a fact, however, that in our sessions we consistently observed a very sim-
ilar behavior in the initial periods in the two groups. In our sample, the
difference in behavior follows almost entirely from the experience ac-
quired during the session.11
The bottom panels of figure 1 show that there is no significant differ-
ence in the first period.12 Similarly in the BoSC, figure 3 shows no differ-
ence in the rate of compromise outcomes in the initial period. Recall,
however, that in the BoSC we are considering the outcome rather than
the choice; thus the interpretation is less straightforward because of the
difficulty of achieving coordination in period 1 between pairs.
In appendix E.2.2 we examine how the difference in cooperation and
compromise rates between the two groups develops taking as benchmark
the first-round choice of a player who is facing a new partner and, hence,
cannot rely on a history of play. Players in high-IQ groups are increasingly
more likely to openwith a cooperative choice if comparedwith the bench-
mark represented by the combined sessions; this trend in the low-IQ ses-
sion is smaller. In the BoSC we cannot detect any significant difference
in the trends of the first-round outcomes between the high- and low-IQ11 The behavioral attitude to cooperate also is similar in the two groups: in the debriefing
questionnaire we asked subjects about their intrinsic motivation to cooperate and found no
significant difference between the two IQ groups. Participants were asked whether they
agreed that they cooperate because “I feel that is the right thing to do” and “It makes me
feel nice”; there are no significant differences in the responses between the two IQ groups
(p-value 5 .7402 and p-value 5 .2443, respectively).
12 The first-period cooperation choice for the PD is examined in detail in table A.20,
where we consider all PD data together to increase the power of our estimation. In these
regressions we include all data concerning the PD. Hence, we also use the low continuation
probability treatment data and the personality split treatments that will be illustrated be-
low. From col. 1, there is no significant effect due to the IQ level; considering the other
individual characteristics, only Agreeableness has a significant positive effect in the expected
direction of increasing the initial cooperation rate. This effect, as we will argue later, is tran-
sitory.
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Allgroups. The reason could be that in the BoSC the difference between
high- and low-IQ groups appears faster than in the PD because coordina-
tion is probably more difficult in the BoSC than in the PD; we discuss the
difficulty of achieving coordination more extensively in Section V.B.4. Cooperation with Low Continuation ProbabilityWe have seen substantial differences in the long-run rate of cooperation
of the two groups of players, with more intelligent groups achieving higher
rates of cooperation. This could be explained by an unconditional atti-
tude: more intelligent players could have a generalized inclination to co-
operate in strategic environments. We reject this hypothesis by consider-
ing repeated games with the same PD stage game (payoffs again as in
table A.1) but lower continuation probability, d 5 :5. Figure 4 aggregates
the different sessions; the dotted line represents an anomalous behavior
we observed only in one session (session 7). If we exclude that exception,
cooperation rates in the two groups are similar, and low, as in Dal Bó and
Fréchette (2011) when they use the same parameters we use in this treat-FIG. 4.—PD with low continuation probability: cooperation and payoffs per period in
the low- and high-IQ sessions. Panels A and B report averages computed over observations
in blocks of five supergames. The gray lines represent all low-IQ sessions, the black lines
represent the high-IQ sessions featuring a downward or stable trend of cooperation, and
the dotted line represents the high-IQ session with an upward trend of cooperation (ses-
sion 7). Panels C and D report the average of cooperation and payoffs in the first round
(of a repeated game) that occurs in the three different groups of sessions separately. Bands
represent 95 percent confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000ment (p. 419, fig. 1, third panel in top row).13 Wemake the following con-
clusion:
Result 4.2. Subjects of higher intelligence are not unconditional co-
operators. In some cases they fail to establish high rates of cooperation or
even an upward trend.B. Games without Trade-offsThe second prediction of our substantive hypothesis 2.3 is the similarity
in behavior of the two groups of subjects with different intelligence in
games in which the natural equilibria do not have the trade-off between
short-term gain and long-term loss (BoS and SH).
Our data provide strong support for the hypothesis that intelligence
has a very different effect in games with trade-off if compared with games
without trade-off. In the treatment in which subjects—separated accord-
ing to their IQ—play a repeated StagHunt (SH) game (payoffs in table A.3)
and continuation probability d 5 :75, cooperation is reached soon and
maintained throughout the session; this is true independently of the in-
telligence group as we illustrate in figure 5.14 The stability of the agree-
ment hinges on the small deviations from past successes in implementing
cooperation on (S, S) (see panel A of fig. 6; this holds for both groups).15
In the BoS (payoffs in table A.2) and d 5 :75, coordination is more
complex because players have to find an agreement on how to imple-
ment the alternation; lacking communication, and in the absence of a
natural symmetric way to reach an agreement, players have to rely on
chance, for example, waiting until the first time coordination on a pos-
itive outcome occurs and then alternating. In the top panel of figure 7,
where we aggregated the level of coordination and payoffs of all sessions
by IQ group, we see that a very similar pattern between the two groups is
realized, with the high-IQ group achieving coordination slightly faster.16
However, panel B of figure 6 suggests that once coordination on alternat-
ing across nonzero outcomes is achieved, both groups of subjects deviate13 From panel B of fig. A.7 in app. K, we note that cooperation rates in all low-IQ sessions
decline from an initial 50 percent to very low values. In the high-IQ sessions high rates of
cooperation occur but are infrequent. In only one session (session 7) cooperation rates in-
crease. In the other high-IQ sessions (sessions 1, 3, and 5), cooperation declines or is
roughly stable as in the low-IQ sessions.
14 In fig. A.16 of app. L, we see similar patterns replicated in each pair of contiguous ses-
sions. Tables A.26 and A.27 in app. M confirm what fig. 5 suggests: IQ is a nonsignificant
predictor of the rate of S choice, payoffs, and the S choice in period 1.
15 In table A.73, we present the estimation of the individuals’ strategies in the two
groups.
16 See fig. A.15 in app. L for the plots of coordination per single session, where similar
patterns per each group are displayed. Table A.28 in app. M shows that IQ has no effect on
the coordination rate (cols. 1 and 2).
This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
000 journal of political economy
Allvery little from the alternating strategy and in a way that is not statistically
different. Hence we get the following result:
Result 4.3. As hypothesis 2.3 predicts, in games with no trade-off be-
tween short-run gain and continuation loss—in SH and BoS—no signifi-
cant coordination differences occur between the two intelligence groups.
Instead, we find that the high- and low-IQ groups undergo a different
process (in BoS and SH) to reach agreement. We discuss this below in
Section V.B.C. Errors in the Strategy ImplementationWe have seen that, in games with the trade-off, cooperation and compro-
mise rates in the low- and high-IQ groups are initially similar and diverge
later. Ourhypothesis 2.3 predicts that the two groups differ in consistency
of strategy implementation. Here we test the prediction and the hypoth-
esis that such inconsistency explains the divergence in behavior. The hy-
pothesis is supported: we see a cumulative effect of a small but significant
difference in cooperation and compromise induced by the choices of the
partner in the past; these small differences cumulate to produce largeFIG. 5.—SH: stag choice and payoffs per period in the low- and high-IQ sessions. Pan-
els A and B report the averages computed over observations in successive blocks of five
supergames of all high- and all low-IQ sessions, aggregated separately; the black and gray
lines report the average stag choices for high- and low-IQ subjects in each block, respec-
tively. Panels C and D report the stag choices and payoffs in the first period in the two IQ
sessions separately. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
FIG. 6.—Consistency in SH and BoS. Stag Hunt: Panel A reports the percentage of the
Stag choices if the same pair coordinated on (Stag, Stag) in period t 2 1, computed over ob-
servations in successive blocks of five supergames, of all high- and all low-IQ sessions aggre-
gated separately. Battle of Sexes: Panel B reports the percentage of the alternating choices
if the same pair coordinated on an alternated outcome in periods t 2 1 and t 2 2 computed
over observations in successive blocks of five supergames, of all high- and all low-IQ ses-
sions aggregated separately. The black and gray lines refer to the high- and low-IQ subjects
in each block, respectively. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Alldifferences between the two groups. Panels A and D of figure 8 illustrate
how low-IQ groups choose cooperation less frequently following cooper-
ation of the partner in the previous period.
This lower C response to C of the partner in the previous period might
be due either to a higher general inclination to choose D or, more specif-
ically, to a switch toD after a joint (C,C) choice. Panels C and F of figure 8
show that a significant part of the decline in cooperation is explained by a
defection after a joint cooperation in the low-IQ group, as goal neglect
theory would suggest (the number of observations of joint cooperation
in this group is small; hence the higher standard errors). Following defec-
tion, we see a very high rate of D choice in both groups; if anything, the
rate is higher in the high-IQ group (see panels B and E of fig. 8): more
intelligent players are better at disciplining behavior of defectors, and,
thus, they are better teachers.
The bottom panels of figure 8 show the corresponding results for
compromise rates in BoSC. The pattern matches what we have seen in
the PD, as hypothesis 2.3 predicts. In this case the low-IQ group subjects
are less likely to respond to aW choice of the partner in the previous pe-
riod by making the same W choice in turn (panel G of fig. 8). After a
choice of the best-outcome action B by the partner, the response is, in
both groups, a choice of B. The deviation to a B choice after a joint com-FIG. 7.—BoS: outcomes and payoffs in the low- and high-IQ sessions. The four panels
report the averages computed over observations in successive blocks of five supergames
of all high- and all low-IQ sessions, aggregated separately. The black and gray lines report
the average choices for high- and low-IQ subjects in each block, respectively. Alternating
occurs when subjects in the same match choose (B, W ) and (W, B) in two consecutive pe-
riods; repeating occurs when (B,W ) or (W, B) happens consecutively for two periods in the
same match. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000promise choice (W, W ) is significantly and clearly higher for the low-IQ
group (panel I of fig. 8), as the goal neglect hypothesis 2.3 proposes.17
Figure 9 shows the effect of individual intelligence on the probability
of defection in PD and failure to compromise in BoSC.We graph the frac-
tion of deviating choices following successful cooperation or compromise
in the previous round, hence, representing the propensity to exhibit goal
neglect. The probability of goal neglect declines with intelligence. Com-
paring the histograms in figure 9 between the IQ-split and the combined
treatments, we can argue that in the combined treatment, the choices that
individuals make in the second-lowest IQ quantile are less inconsistent
than those in the IQ-split treatment, suggesting that they benefit from be-
ing combined with subjects of higher intelligence. It is also interesting toFIG. 8.—Conditional cooperation and coordination per period. We report the averages
computed over observations in successive blocks of five supergames. For PD IQ-split, the
black and gray lines report the average cooperation for high- and low-IQ subjects in each
block. For PD combined treatment, the dashed lines represent the average cooperation in
each block; the black and gray lines report the average cooperation for high- and low-IQ
partitions in each block. For BoSC, the gray line represents all low-IQ sessions and the
black line represents the high-IQ sessions.17 In app. E.2.3 we analyze how subjects react to partners’ choices using a variation of the
econometric model A-2 presented in Sec. E.
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Allnote that in the BoSC, subjects seem to be more inconsistent than in the
PD, which is reasonable given that the BoSC is a more complex game, as
we have argued above.
We conclude this section by stating that in the BoSC and in the PD,
subjects of higher intelligence are more consistent in strategy implemen-
tation. In the next section we provide a formal presentation of these re-
sults by estimating the model of errors presented in Section III.D. Errors: Test and EstimatesIn table 2 we estimate equation (3) by postulating a linear functional form
for the function l, with coefficients l0 and lIQ > 0 (l increasing). In the
table we report coefficients rather than odds ratios (as we do elsewhere
in the paper) because we focus here on the structural estimation of equa-
tion (3).
The dependent variable is the error choice; for the PD it is set equal to
one if the subject chooses defect (D) after a round of mutual coopera-
tion (C, C) and equal to zero if the subject chooses cooperate (C) after
a round of mutual cooperation (C, C). We classify a choice of D after a
last-period action profile (C, C) as an error, that is, as providing a totalFIG. 9.—PD and BoSC: deviation from natural equilibrium if natural equilibrium is the
outcome at time t 2 1 by subjects sorted in IQ quantiles. Vertical axis: fraction of D choice
when the action profile in the previous period was (C, C) for PD and fraction of B choice
when the action profile in the previous period was (W,W ). Bands represent 95 percent con-
fidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
TABLE 2
Errors of Strategy Implementation for PD, SH, BoS, and BoSC: Effects of IQ,
Personality, Other Characteristics, and Groups
PD BoSC SH BoS
Errors .0248 .0738 .0081 .0192
DuG 216.75 213.14 223 216.107
Constant 24.39020** .31035 4.33101 23.78149*
(1.8656) (3.3263) (3.5788) (2.2222)
IQ 25.28479*** 26.12849*** 21.73294 23.26260*
(1.0094) (1.7425) (3.2501) (1.8357)
Openness 1.09335 1.60513 21.30327 .99838
(.8488) (1.6059) (3.2827) (2.1065)
Conscientiousness 1.11803 2.25533 29.58399*** 2.17029
(.9245) (1.2196) (2.9917) (1.6033)
Extraversion 1.35014 .17331 3.01258 2.19362
(.9491) (1.3762) (2.0499) (1.2930)
Agreeableness 2.16864 1.04193 27.03396** .55189
(.8353) (1.2148) (3.1563) (1.4925)
Neuroticism .86062 2.56918 24.34203 .44175
(.9595) (1.3762) (2.9467) (1.4534)
Risk aversion 21.89355** 21.32862 3.93315 2.25920
(.8900) (1.5058) (2.8547) (1.4665)
Female .22983 .56763 .18144 .69519
(.3423) (.5559) (.9453) (.5163)
Age .00177 .01746 2.04414 .02335
(.0554) (.0948) (.0972) (.0429)
ln j2u
Constant 2.18462*** 1.55227*** 2.05973*** .66884
(.1509) (.1890) (.2959) (.6140)
Culture fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Type No Yes No Yes
Observations 29,982 4,998 7,252 2,411This content
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Allpayoff smaller than the alternative, since for none of the strategies that
we have identified is choosing D optimal. Using a similar reasoning for
the SH, the dependent variable (error) is set equal to one if the subject
chooses H after a round of (S, S) and set equal to zero if the subject
chooses S after a round of (S, S). For the BoSC, the dependent variable
(error) is set equal to one if the subject chooses the best option, B, after a
round of mutual compromise (W, W ), and it is set equal to zero if the
subject chooses compromise after a round of mutual compromise. For
the BoS, the dependent variable (error) is set equal to one if the subject
makes the same choice in t 2 1 and t after two rounds of alternation at
t 2 1 and t 2 2; it is set equal to zero if the subject makes a different
choice in t and t 2 1 after two rounds of alternation at t 2 1 and t 2 2.
In table 2 we see that in all four games the coefficient of IQ is negative,
but of much greater magnitude in the PD and the BoSC, while it is not
significant in the SH and BoS. Therefore, we have the following result:
Result 4.4. In BoSC and in PD subjects of lower intelligence make a
larger number of errors in strategy implementation, while there is no sig-
nificant difference in the SH and in the BoS, as hypothesis 2.3 predicts.
From the estimates of costs in terms of utility of making a mistake (the
values of DuG on the top of the table) we observe that there is no increas-
ing relationship between DuG and the coefficient of IQ as the more re-
strictive model 3 (or A-10 in app. E.3) would suggest. Results in table 2
clearly suggest a difference in the effect of the intelligence between games
with a trade-off and games without a trade-off as in the general form A-9
presented in appendix E.3, where we also provide a further test of this dif-
ference. Overall, we summarize as follows:
Result 4.5. Subjects of higher intelligence are more consistent in
strategy implementation, as point ii of the general hypothesis 2.1 pre-
dicts.V. Strategic ReasoningThe second general way in which intelligence may affect strategic behav-
ior is in the ability to identify the most profitable strategies in an environ-
ment, as we state in our general hypothesis 2.1.A. Best Response and IntelligenceA direct test of the hypothesis that intelligence affects the ability to iden-
tify the most profitable strategies is the test of whether subjects’ choices
are the best responses to the empirical frequency of the strategy of the
other participants in the session. We consider, consistently with Dal Bó
and Fréchette (2011), the set (Always Defect, Always Cooperate, Grim
Trigger, Tit for Tat, Win Stay Lose Shift, Tit for 2 Tats) of strategies inThis content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000the repeated game, respectively denoted as {AD, AC, GT, TfT, WSLS, TfT2}.
For each pair of such strategies we can compute the payoff in a repeated
game if the two players adopt that pair. We call Sophisticated Coopera-
tion, SC, any strategy in the set different from AD and AC. A very useful
simplification of the analysis is possible because the payoff to each player
is the same for any representative strategy we choose in this set. For in-
stance, the profile (AD, GT) gives a profile of payoffs ðð1 2 dÞ50 1 d25,
ð1 2 dÞ12 1 d25Þ, which is the same as the payoff induced by (AD, TfT).
We have thus defined a new normal form game, which we call the strategy
choice game. The payoff matrix for the row player is
AD AC SC
AD 25 50 1 2 dð Þ50 1 d25
AC 12 48 48
SC 1 2 dð Þ12 1 d25 48 48
:
An entry in the row labeled SC means that any strategy in the SC set
gives to the row player the payoff in the corresponding entry against the
respective strategy in the column, including the case in which in the col-
umn we have SC, again to be interpreted “for any strategy in the set SC.”
The strategy AC is weakly dominated by SC if d > 0. Note that the strategy
choice game restricted to actions AD and SC is a symmetric 2  2 coordi-
nation game with two pure Nash equilibria (AD, AD) and (SC, SC).
To assess the optimality of the strategy chosen by our subjects in both
the low-IQ and high-IQ groups, we need to estimate the empirical fre-
quency with which they played the different strategies. This will allow us
to compute the expected returns from playing each strategy. We use the
samemethodused inDal Bó and Fréchette (2011). The likelihood of each
strategy is estimated by maximum likelihood, assuming that the subjects
have a fixed probability of choosing one of the six strategies in the time
horizon under consideration. We focus on the last five and first five inter-
actions. The likelihood that the data correspond to a given strategy was ob-
tained by allowing the subjects some error in their choices in any round,
where error is defined as a deviation from the prescribed action according
to their strategy. A detailed description of the estimation procedure is in
Dal Bó and Fréchette’s online appendix.18 In appendix M (tables A.68–
A.70) we report the results of the estimation for the high continuation
probability, low continuation probability, and combined treatments.
Table 3 reports the expected payoffs and empirical frequencies in the
two groups (high- and low-IQ) across the two continuation probabilities18 See pp. 6–11, available online at https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?idp10.1257/aer
.101.1.411.
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Allwe used for the PD, for the last five supergames played, respectively. Con-
sider first the case d 5 :75. For the high-IQ group, AC and SC give the
same payoff, 43 percent larger than AD; the frequency is concentrated
on SC (87 percent). For the low-IQ group, SC is the best response (28 per-
cent higher than AD and 13 percent higher than AD), but the best re-
sponse is played 53 percent of the time and the worst 44 percent of the
time. In the case d 5 :5, for the high-IQ group, SC and AD give approx-
imately the same payoff, 15 percent higher than the AC; and the best re-
sponses are the only strategies played. The low-IQ group plays the best
response AD (giving a payoff 8 percent higher than the second-best re-
sponse, SC) 77 percent of the time.
The above comparison does not adequately take into account the fact
that players with higher intelligence play a larger number of games; so if
experience comes from the number of rounds played, rather than clock
time elapsed, the players are more experienced in the last games. A way
to compensate for this is to consider the frequency at rounds in which
players of the two groups have equivalent experience measured by num-
ber of rounds. Table 4 reports the same analysis for the last five super-
games with equivalent experience. It shows that the difference in ability
to best respond is already in place. For example, in the case d 5 :75, SC
gives the highest payoff, 5 percent larger than AC and 38 percent larger
than AD; the frequency is already concentrated in the responses (74 per-
cent), with the inferior strategy AD chosen 21 percent of the time. For
the low-IQ group the highest payoff strategy (SC) is played 50 percent
of the time and the worst strategy (AD) 43 percent of the time. If we con-
sider the low-d case, in the high-IQ group, the best response is AD or SCTABLE 3
Payoff at Empirical Frequency and Frequency
High IQ Low IQ
Payoff Frequency Payoff Frequency
d 5 .75:
AC 46.49 .089 32.03 .027
AD 32.65 .042 28.97 .443
SC 46.90 .869 36.36 .530
Expected payoff 46.27 32.97
d 5 .5:
AC 26.33 0 20.21 0
AD 29.97 .602 27.85 .772
SC 30.24 .398 25.22 .228
Expected payoff 30.08 27.25This content downloa
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000(thepayoffs from these two strategies are approximately equal, and 20per-
cent higher than AC, and it is played 91 percent of the time). In the low-IQ
group, the best response is AD (9 percent higher than SC, and it is played
73 percent of the time).
The average payoff per round in the high IQ-group is higher than in
the low-IQ group. For example, in table 4 the expected payoff (from em-
pirical frequency against empirical frequency) for the high-IQ group is
39.86, while for the low-IQ group it is 33.57. We can think of this differ-
ence as the outcome of two separate effects. The first effect is on individ-
ual choice: a subject in a group can increase his payoff by choosing the
best response to the frequency of the group. In the high-IQ group, shift-
ing from AD to SC gives a large gain (a gain of 11.68 over the 30.75 from
using AD), while in the low-IQ group the shift gives a smaller gain (a gain
of 6.8 over the 29.99 from using AD). The reason for the smaller gain is,
of course, that a large fraction of subjects in the latter group are playing
AD. The second effect is on group choice. We measure this effect with
the difference between the maximum payoffs that a subject can achieve
in the two groups at the best response within his group. This difference
is due only to the group behavior. In the high-IQ group the difference is
42.43, and in the low-IQ group it is 36.79.
In conclusion, independently of the fact that higher total payoffs will
accrue to highly intelligent players simply because they play a larger num-
ber of rounds, we can state the following result:
Result 5.1. Subjects in the high-IQ sessions have a higher payoff per
round, in part because they are closer to the best response and in sub-TABLE 4
Payoff at Empirical Frequency and Frequency
High IQ Low IQ
Payoff Frequency Payoff Frequency
d 5 .75:
AC 40.36 .044 32.62 .075
AD 30.75 .212 29.99 .427
SC 42.43 .743 36.79 .498
Expected payoff 39.86 33.57
d 5 .5:
AC 25.79 .081 21.45 .037
AD 30.81 .616 28.74 .737
SC 29.80 .301 26.24 .226
Expected payoff 30.09 27.91This content down
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Allstantial part because they are coordinating closer to the (SC, SC) equi-
librium of the strategy choice game. This is as point i of the general hy-
pothesis 2.1 predicts.
This is particularly noticeable in the last five supergames, where the
fraction of AD in the high-IQ group has fallen below 5 percent. An ad-
ditional benefit of higher intelligence in our experiment, and likely in
real life, is the ability to process information faster, and hence to accu-
mulate more extensive experience, and to learn from it.19B. Achieving CoordinationAs we argued in Section II.B, achieving coordination on the natural alter-
nating equilibrium in BoS is harder than coordinating on (S, S) in SH.
Achieving coordination at the alternating equilibrium is not easy without
communication. This provides a test of the hypothesis that more intelli-
gent players identify efficient equilibria more rapidly. Figure 7 shows that
although the two groups are virtually identical in the frequency of achiev-
ing coordination on a positive payoff outcome (and thus on payoffs), they
differ in the frequency of alternating coordination, even in the long run,
with a difference ofmore than 10percent (panel C). PanelD indicates that
subjects in low-IQ sessions are more likely to replicate the same outcome
between two consecutive periods.20
Clearly, in the first round of a repeated game with a new partner, sub-
jects have no way to coordinate, even if they have a history of successful
coordination with previous partners and are very intelligent or inclined
to cooperation. But in the second round of a repeated game, the success-
ful start of an alternating equilibrium may take place, and this depends
crucially on the correct choice of the move: the player who played B
should now playW and vice versa.21 We summarize this observation as fol-
lows:
Result 5.2. Subjects of higher intelligence are faster in achieving co-
ordination in the efficient alternating equilibrium in BoS, whereas there
is no substantial difference in SH, as predicted by hypothesis 2.2.19 One has to consider these results with some care, considering the difference between
the analyst’s situation and that of the subjects. In estimating the best response we are using
information on frequency of strategies that subjects do not have; they do not observe the
entire sequence of plays. Instead, they observe the sequence of plays only for the games in
which they are participants. Limiting the identification of the strategies to the sample ob-
served by each subject is impossible because the sample is too small.
20 Similar reasoning applies for the BoSC: from fig. 3 we note that in the high-IQ groups
more participants reach the most efficient outcome (i.e., compromise) almost from the
beginning.
21 This is confirmed by table A.28, which shows that IQ has a very strong and significant
effect on alternating (see col. 3) and no effect on coordination (col. 2).
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000VI. Personality and Strategic Behavior
A. ConscientiousnessIn Section II.C, we hypothesized that, in general, the effect of Conscien-
tiousness may be different for different facets, making the net effect that
can be predicted on theoretical grounds ambiguous. In our data, the net
effect in the C-split treatment is clear in figure 10: Conscientiousness
reduces cooperation rates, and it does so from the first period, even be-
fore interaction takes place and learning modifies behavior. The reduc-
tion is particularly strong in one of the sessions of high-Conscientiousness
(high-C); the trend relative to this session is singled out in figure 10.22
The histogram at the bottom of figure 10 shows that the difference is sub-
stantial and significant in the first period. The effect is in the same direc-
tion for payoffs. The econometric analysis in the appendix shows that the
pooled data of subjects in the low-Conscientiousness (low-C) sessions show
an increase of more than 15 percent in the cooperation rate and an in-
crease of four experimental units in payoff (see the last three columns
of table A.31).23
The effect of Conscientiousness on cooperative choices appears smaller
(and nonsignificant) if we consider the data in the combined treatment
(see fig. A.12 in the appendix). Clearly, as was the case for the role of In-
telligence, the effect of Conscientiousness on behavior is stronger when
individuals with a similar score interact. However, Conscientiousness ap-
pears to be distinct from Intelligence in that the presence of two highly con-
scientious players—rather than one individual—seems a necessary condi-
tion for the trait to have a measurable impact on outcomes.24 Why this
negative net effect of Conscientiousness?
Our hypothesis 2.4 identifies the cautiousness facet as possibly produc-
ing a reduction of cooperation rates in our environment, with all the other
facets having the opposite effect. We test this explanation by considering
the specific effect of each facet. We first perform factor analysis on the an-
swers provided to the questionnaire and identify four main factors (those
with eigenvalues larger than one). Analyzing the coefficients of each ques-22 In app. K we present a more detailed analysis of all sessions of the C-split treatments in
fig. A.10.
23 The effect is also evident from table A.21, where we note that in the low-C sessions the
odds ratio for the trend is bigger than in the combined sessions.
24 This could explain why we do not observe any significant effect of individual Consci-
entiousness when we include session fixed effects, as table A.19 shows. The negative effect
of Conscientiousness in the C-split treatment is clear from the strategy table A.72 that we
include in the appendix; the table shows the frequency of strategies used by different
groups in early and late supergames. Subjects in the high-C group start with a larger frac-
tion of the AD strategy, 31 percent compared to 12 percent of the low-C group; this is con-
sistent with the first-period behavior shown in fig. 10.
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Alltion, we identify the first factor as the cautiousness facet.25 We then regress
cooperation rate and payoff on the four factors we have identified and the
Conscientiousness score. The analysis reported in table 5 confirms the role
of cautiousness: the corresponding factor 1 is the only significant factor,
and its effect is a reduction of the cooperation rate by between 33 and
40 percent. We make the following conclusion:
Result 6.1. Conscientiousness has a negative impact on coopera-
tion due to the cautiousness facet, as predicted by hypothesis 2.4.B. AgreeablenessAgreeableness as a factor is naturally associated with cooperative behav-
ior, and so are all its facets (see hypothesis 2.5); this should translate to
higher cooperation rates, independent of experience, and should be re-FIG. 10.—PD with high continuation probability: cooperation and payoffs per period
in the low- and high-Conscientiousness sessions. Panels A and B report the averages com-
puted over observations in successive blocks of five supergames of all high- and all low-
Conscientiousness sessions, aggregated separately; the black and gray lines report the average
cooperation and average payoffs for high- and low-Conscientiousness sessions, respectively.
The dotted line represents session 5, which has not been aggregated with the other high-
C sessions. Panels C and D report the average of cooperation and payoffs in the first period
among the two groups of sessions. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.25 For example, the two items with the highest coefficient for the first factor are “Jump
into things without thinking” and “Make rush decisions” (both reverse coded). Table A.30
reports the items, facets, and the coefficients for each item.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000alized from first periods. Our data, as seen in figure 11, confirm this. The
bottom histograms show a large and significant positive difference in the
first-period cooperation rates of high-Agreeableness (high-A) groups
compared to low-Agreeableness (low-A) groups, with a difference of ap-TABLE 5
Analysis of Facets in the Conscientiousness-Split Treatments PD
with High Continuation Probability
C-Split
Cooperation
C-Split
Cooperation
C-Split
Cooperation
C-Split
Payoff
Factor 1 (cautiousness) 2.3358*** 2.4011*** 28.4645***
(.1109) (.1281) (2.1373)
Factor 2 .0654 .0421 2.8574
(.1529) (.1693) (2.8243)
Factor 3 2.1223 2.1053 21.7562
(.1572) (.1671) (2.7881)
Factor 4 .0096 2.0338 2.3650
(.1311) (.1390) (2.3189)
Conscientiousness 2.5652***
(.1837)
IQ .2357 .1542 .1576 4.0172
(.1831) (.1909) (.1934) (3.2255)
Openness 2.0574 2.0070 2.1371
(.1564) (.1660) (2.7697)
Extraversion 2.0689 2.0896 2.0110
(.1604) (.1726) (2.8790)
Agreeableness .2614 .2901 .5439
(.1750) (.1846) (3.0787)
Neuroticism .0853 .0664 3.0796
(.1600) (.1797) (2.9977)
Risk aversion .0512 .0262 .0426 3.2139
(.1324) (.1326) (.1341) (2.2374)
Female 2.0209 2.0304 2.0326 2.3221
(.0549) (.0613) (.0640) (1.0674)
Age .0075 .0061 .0054 .1590
(.0075) (.0077) (.0078) (.1300)
Number of subjects 2.0229 2.0212 2.0215 2.4517*
(.0139) (.0138) (.0141) (.2347)
Culture fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R 2 .169 .182 .190 .318
Observations 122 122 122 122This content d
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Allproximately 10 percent, giving support to hypothesis 2.5 that Agreeable-
ness increases unconditional cooperation.26
Frompanel Aof figure 11 (wherewe exclude an anomalous session rep-
resented by the broken line; see app. K for details), we note that both
groups have a positive trend of cooperation. In the long run, however,
the difference is small, in both cooperation rates and payoffs; this can
be observed as well in the econometric analysis we report in the appen-
dix.27 The effect ofAgreeableness on cooperative choices is similar if we con-
sider the two partitions in the combined treatment; from figure A.13 inFIG. 11.—PD with high continuation probability: cooperation and payoffs per period in
the low- and high-Agreeableness sessions. Panels A andB report the averages computed over
observations in successive blocks of five supergames of all high- and all low-Agreeableness
sessions, aggregated separately; the black and gray lines report the average cooperation
and average payoffs for high- and low-Agreeableness sessions. The dotted line represents
session 7, which not been aggregated with the other high-A sessions. Panels C and D report
the average of cooperation and payoffs in the first period among the two groups of ses-
sions. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.26 This strong initial effect is confirmed in table A.20. There we find a significant effect
for Agreeableness even after including session fixed effects (i.e., controlling for “environ-
mental” effects and, more specifically, for the effect of being in a high-A group as well). The
odds that a more agreeable person cooperates are 4.5 times greater than those for a less
agreeable person. This is the only significant predictor in the regression.
27 As shown in table A.31 (first three columns), the effect of being in a low- or high-A
group in all periods is small on payoffs and insignificant on cooperation rates. Consistently,
table A.19 (in which we consider all the sessions) reports similar effects of Agreeableness in
cols. 1 and 3. Furthermore, from col. 2 of table A.21, we note that there is no difference in
the trend of cooperation between low- and high-A groups and the combined groups. From
col. 2 of table A.22, we note that subjects scoring higher on Agreeableness are less likely to
reciprocate more as they acquire more experience, again suggesting that Agreeableness
mostly has an effect on unconditional cooperation.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000the appendix, we can clearly observe a difference between the high- and
low-A partitions in the beginning and their convergence toward the final
rounds. In conclusion:
Result 6.2. Agreeableness has a positive impact on cooperation, but
the effect is strong in magnitude only in the early stages, as hypothesis
2.5 predicts.VII. Response TimeThe time to decide has minor direct interest for economic analysis but
provides very useful information on the decision process and thus on how
the observed differences in cooperation rates and payoffs originate.
Our first hypothesis concerns equilibrium choices and deviations, or
response to deviations. After convergence to a natural equilibriumhas oc-
curred, the implicitly agreed behavior becomes the natural choice and,
thus, the output of a decision that should not require specific attention.
On the contrary, a choice of deviation or the response to a deviation of
others is slower:
Hypothesis 7.1. For all types of subjects, the equilibrium choice
takes less time than a deviation or a response to a deviation.
The relationship between cognitive and noncognitive skills and time to
decide is provided by the conceptual structure that we have developed,
differentiating games with respect to the existence of a trade-off between
short-run gains and long-run losses. We hypothesize that less intelligent
players who have to avoid the goal neglect error will need more time
when they have to evaluate this trade-off:
Hypothesis 7.2. In PD and BoSC, namely, games with a trade-off be-
tween short-run gains and long-run losses from deviation at the natural
equilibrium, response time is shorter for players of higher intelligence
when they choose cooperation for PDandcompromise forBoSC thanwhen
they choose otherwise. There is little difference in response time in the two
choices in BoS and SH.
We now turn to the test of the hypotheses. In PD and in the BoSC,
high-IQ groups have a shorter response time, as we see from figure 12.
Result 7.1. In line with hypothesis 7.1, subjects think longer when
they decide to deviate from cooperation to defection in the PD.
In figure 12 we observe that this difference is large and significant for
the high-IQ group and small and not statistically significant in the low-IQ
group, which has lower cooperation rates, as predicted in hypothesis 7.1.28
In BoSC, the analysis is complicated by the fact that we have more than
onenatural equilibrium. Subjects cancoordinateoncompromise (i.e., out-28 Furthermore, table A.32 confirms this: individuals choosing C take less time to make
the choice (sign of cooperate in col. 1), and this effect is stronger the higher is the subjects’
IQ (col. 2).
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Allcome (W,W ) in table A.4) or alternate between the two outcomes (W, B)
and (B, W ) or finally settle on one of the (W, B), (B, W ) outcomes. The
analysis is unambiguous for equilibria yielding the (W,W ) outcome. From
the bottom panels of figure 12, more intelligent players that saw the com-
promise (W, W ) outcome at t 2 1 have a shorter response time for when
they chooseW (aiming at a compromise outcome) than when they choose
B, confirming hypothesis 7.2.
Table A.33 in the appendix confirms the result illustrated in figure 12
for the BoSC: individuals in general respond faster when they are playing
the compromise (W,W ) outcome (col. 1), and this decision is quicker for
higher-IQ individuals (col. 2). This last effect is not significant but is quite
high in magnitude, possibly because of the rarity of event B at t, if (W,W )
occurred at t 2 1. For games with no trade-off between short-term and
long-term advantages, there is little difference in response time between
the two actions in both the high-IQ and low-IQ groups for BoS (see
fig. 13).29 We summarize the above discussion as follows:FIG. 12.—PD and BoSC: response time in the different treatments by IQ groups and
choice C, D, W, and B represents the different choices in the two games. For the BoSC
the choices are conditional on the fact that at t 2 1 the two players compromised (i.e.,
played (W,W )). The gray line represents all low-IQ sessions, and the black line represents
the high-IQ sessions. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.29 Fromfig. 13, note that in SH the lower payoff actionH takes longer for both types, and
particularly for the low-IQ group. Given that this is a complex trade-off (between riskiness
and payoff), the difference is natural.
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000Result 7.2. In PD and BoSC, response time is shorter for players of
higher intelligence when they choose cooperation for PD and compro-
mise for BoSC than when they choose otherwise. There is little difference
in response time in the two choices in BoS. This in part confirms hypoth-
esis 7.2.
A trait that might affect the length of response time is Conscientious-
ness. We discuss this briefly in appendix G, where we show that response
time is shorter for the subjects in high-Conscientiousness groups.VIII. ConclusionsOur experiment tested the hypothesis that groups of individuals with dif-
ferent levels of intelligence or different personalities, but who are other-
wise similar, will exhibit different levels of cooperation in bilateral inter-
actions with others from their group. The interactions were repeated,
giving time and opportunity for each participant to observe and to re-
flect on the past behavior of the other.
The outcome of games with a trade-off between short-run gain and
continuation value loss was strikingly different when played by subjects
with higher or lower levels of intelligence. Higher intelligence resultedFIG. 13.—SH and BoS: response time in the different treatments by IQ groups and
choice. In the Battle of Sexes, the “alternate” choice denotes a choice different from the
one taken at t 2 1. The gray line represents all low-IQ sessions, and the black line repre-
sents the high-IQ sessions. Bands represent 95 percent confidence intervals.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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Allin significantly higher levels of cooperation and earnings. The failure of
individuals with lower intelligence to appropriately estimate the future
consequences of current actions accounts for these difference in outcomes.
Personality also affects behavior, but in smallermeasure, andwith lowper-
sistence. These results have potentially important implications for policy.
For example, while the complex effects of early childhood intervention
on the development of intelligence are still currently being evaluated
(e.g., Heckman et al. 2006), our results suggest that any such effect would
potentially enhance not only the economic success of the individual but
the level of cooperation in society (at least when interactions are repeated).
More in detail, our main conclusions for the class of simple repeated
games are as follows:
Everything else being equal, groups composed of individuals with higher levels
of intelligence exhibit higher or equal levels of cooperation in the class of games we
consider. In our data, intelligence is associated with different long-run be-
havior in a sequence of repeated games played within the group, and
higher cooperation rates are associated with higher intelligence.
Higher cooperation rates are produced by interaction over time in groups of in-
dividualswith higher intelligence. Cooperation rates in the initial rounds (ap-
proximately 20 rounds) are statistically equal in the two groups. Thus,
the experience of past interaction, not a difference in attitude in the ini-
tial stages, explains the higher cooperation rate.
Higher cooperation is sensitive to the continuation probability, so it is not the
result of an unconditional inclination of higher-intelligence individuals to coop-
erate. Intelligence operates via strategy implementation and strategic thinking.
We have identified a crucial distinction among games in which the gain
fromdeviation froma given strategy has to beweighed against future losses
and those in which it does not. When a nontrivial trade-off has to be eval-
uated, individuals with higher intelligence achieve a substantially higher
rate of cooperation; the difference in intelligence levels becomes irrele-
vant when this trade-off is absent. In the low continuation probability
game, cooperation is less profitable in the long run, and subjects in the
higher-intelligence groups also experience large and growing rates of de-
fection over time. In conclusion, both environment and incentives mat-
ter: intelligencemodulates the response to incentives rather than directly
determining behavior.
Intelligence matters substantially more in the long run than other factors and
personality traits. Our method allows for a direct and an indirect test. The
direct test is based on examining the cooperative behavior of groups sys-
tematically differing in a given trait. The indirect test is based on the anal-
ysis of the statistical relationship of traits with the choice to cooperate. We
find a transitory association of cooperation rates with personality traits:
intelligence is the determining factor in long-run cooperative behavior.This content downloaded from 137.222.190.205 on May 14, 2019 03:27:01 AM
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intelligence, personality, and gains from cooperation 000Intelligence operates through thinking about strategic choices. Differences in
behavior could arise for different reasons. For instance, intelligencemight
be associated with a cooperative attitude, either as a result of a behavioral
inclination or as the result of utility that individuals might derive from
the outcome, such as winning approval of others or avoiding conflict.
Our data instead provide support for the idea that intelligence is most
likely to influence the way in which subjects think about the behavior
of others, how they learn from it, and how they try to modify it. Intelli-
gence is relevant for learning and teaching. We have produced two pieces
of evidence supporting this interpretation. The first is the difference in
the evolution over time of the response of individuals to the choicesmade
by their partner in the past. A small but significant difference in the choice
to cooperate with the current partner in the last period builds up over the
session, and this eventually produces a substantial difference in cooper-
ation rates. The second piece of evidence comes from response times.
Among subjects of higher intelligence, cooperation after the initial stages
becomes the default mode; defection and response to defection instead
require a specifically dedicated and careful balancing of current gains
and future losses. For groups composed of lower-intelligence individuals,
there is no difference.
Conscientiousness affects strategic behavior in the direction of cautiousness,
thus reducing cooperation. Theoretical analysis suggests an ambiguous ef-
fect of Conscientiousness, predicting an increase of cooperation due to
facets such as dutifulness and orderliness but a decrease due to cautious-
ness. We find that the second dominates. This effect is clear in a game
such as the PD, in which the trade-off between the short-run gain and
continuation loss may be perceived as risky, thus leading a cautious indi-
vidual to make the safe choice of always defecting.
Agreeableness induces a transitory increase in cooperation. The effect is nat-
ural; it is, however, small and transitory compared to that induced by In-
telligence.
Our results suggest important questions for the theory of learning in
games, as well as on the link between intelligence and strategies’ ideation
and implementation. The extension to the ability of subjects to conceive
different sets of strategies will require an extension of the design to amore
general class of games, particularly with nonsymmetric stage games. These
are the subjects of current and future research.References
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